Adamopoulos and Restuccia conclude that one of the main causes of inefficiently small farms in poor countries is government policy. Here are some examples they discuss
Many countries have set direct restrictions on farm size. In most cases these restrictions were ceilings on the size of permitted land holdings and were imposed as part of postwar-period land reforms that redistributed land in excess of the ceiling (e.g., Bangladesh, Chile, Ethiopia, India, Korea, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines). In many cases the ceiling on land holdings was accompanied by prohibitions on selling and/ or renting the redistributed land. Other countries have distorted size by also imposing minimum size requirements. This is done either directly by setting an explicit lower bound, as in the case of Indonesia and Puerto Rico, or indirectly by setting conditions for subdivisions, such as a “viability assessment” in the case of Zimbabwe. Several countries have imposed progressive land taxes where larger farms are taxed at a higher rate than smaller farms (e.g., Brazil, Namibia, Pakistan, Zimbabwe). Several African countries have offered input subsidies for fertilizer and seed that are either directly targeted at smallholders or disproportionately benefited them (e.g., Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia). In other cases smallholders were provided with subsidized credit (e.g., Kenya, Philippines) or grants to purchase land (e.g., Malawi). Tenancy regulations, such as rent ceilings, tenure security, and preferential right of purchase (e.g., India), can also provide smallholders with an advantage.
However noble or virtuous it may seem to want to subside "small farms", we should at least acknowledge the adverse consequences and inefficiencies of such policies, which this paper shows are nontrivial because of lower productivity, and as a result lower wages, less economic growth, and higher food prices.